The Recent Surge in Homicides involving Young Black Males and Guns: Time to Reinvest in Prevention and Crime Control

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Summary of Findings

While overall homicide levels in the United States have fluctuated minimally in recent years, those involving young victims and perpetrators—particularly young black males—have surged.

From 2002 to 2007, the number of homicides involving black male juveniles as victims rose by 31% and as perpetrators by 43%. In terms of gun killings involving this same population subgroup, the increases were even more pronounced: 54% for young black male victims and 47% for young black male perpetrators.

The increase in homicide among black youth, coupled with a smaller increase or even decrease among their white counterparts, was consistently true for every region of the country and nearly all population groupings of cities. The pattern also held individually for a majority of states and major cities.

After some decline during the 1990s, the percentage of homicides that involve a gun has increased since 2000, both among young white offenders and black offenders of all age ranges. The percentage of gun homicides for young black offenders has reached nearly 85%. These trends are concomitant with various legislative initiatives at the federal level that have lessened the extent of surveillance on illegal gun markets.

Time-of-day patterns of violent crime victimization for youngsters, ages 6-17, reveal clear differences between school days and out-of-school periods. On school days, the risk spikes during the after-school hours—the primetime for juvenile crime---while the late evening hours are most problematic on non-school days, particularly summertime weekends.

Future demographics suggest that the concern for at-risk youth should increase over the next decade. The number of black and Hispanic children should continue to expand, contrasting with the rather limited increase expected among Caucasian children. There is a significant need for reinvestment in children and families—in essence an at-risk youth bailout during these difficult economic times.

Federal support for policing and youth violence prevention has declined sharply in recent years, perhaps precipitated by complacency brought about by the significant 1990s decline in crime. The resurgence in homicide, especially among minority youth, signals the importance of restoring federal funds for crime prevention and crime control.

At least on the surface, the news from the crime front has seemed encouraging. The FBI, in its recent release of crime figures for the nation, reported that violent crime in 2007 was down across the board compared to 2006, including a 1.3% decline in murder. Although welcomed and widely applauded, the news contrasts sharply with the experience of countless Americans living (and some dying) in violence-infested neighborhoods—those for whom the frightening sound of gunfire is a far too frequent occurrence.

It is not that the FBI figures tell an inaccurate story about crime trends in America. Rather, they obscure the divergent tale of two communities—one prosperous and safe, the other poor and crime-ridden. The truth behind the fears and concerns of the nation's underclasses about crime and violence lies deep beneath the surface of the FBI statistical report.

Recent Homicide Trends

Over the past few years for the nation as a whole, rates of violence, and homicide in particular, have been relatively stable, with rather modest fluctuations since the beginning of the decade. Exploring deeper, this is generally the case as well for whites, black females, and adult black males over the age of 25. But the picture for young black males, especially teenagers, is radically different.

Figures 1-2 display the percentage change over the past five years in the estimated number of homicide victims and offenders (see technical notes on p. 8) among selected groups (males, male juveniles, black male juveniles, and black male juveniles involving a gun). As shown, between 2002 and 2007, the number of homicides involving black male juveniles as victims grew by 31% and as perpetrators by 43%. In terms of gun killings involving this same population subgroup, the increases were even more pronounced: 54% for young black male victims and 47% for young black male perpetrators.

Greater detail pertaining to the number of victims and offenders by age, sex and race—separately and in combination—is provided in Tables 1-3 for each year since 2000. In order to lessen the effects of the volatility from year-to-year in measuring trend, the percentage change rates included in these and other tables compare pooled counts for 2006 and 2007 against a baseline of pooled counts for 2000 and 2001. By this gauge, the number of males committing homicide has increased, particularly for young black males (14-17 and 18-24) and especially involving a gun.

Moving below the national level, the increase in homicides by black youthful offenders is consistent for all nine geographic regions and nearly all population subgroups, as shown in Tables 4-5, suggesting that the problem is not limited to only certain parts of the country. Moreover, these increases contrast with smaller increases and even decreases among white youth.

Finally, Tables 6-7 provide similar percentage change calculations, separately for white and black youthful offenders, for states as well as cities with populations over 500,000 and more than 25 overall homicides annually. Given the smaller base figures at the local level, the change rates are more volatile. Overall, however, a majority of states and a majority of cities have experienced increases in homicides committed by young black offenders compared with smaller increases or even decreases among their white counterparts.

Long Term Homicide Trends

While recent increases in homicides involving young offenders, particularly black males, are of significant concern, when compared to the longer term trends of the past few decades, a different perspective emerges. Tables 8-9 and Figures 3-4 contain the rates of victimization and offending per 100,000 population for males by age and race from 1976 to 2007. The recent surge in homicide among young black males clearly falls far short of the extraordinarily high levels witnessed during the crack-related street gang wars of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, the recent increases may say more about the success of crime prevention and crime control efforts of the past decade than about contemporary failures. In essence, the recent apparent spike in violence indicates that the nation is victim of its earlier success. Were it not for the 1990s downturn, recent figures would hardly stand out as cause for alarm.

Actually, there are naturally-occurring cycles to crime rates. Although not as firm and deterministic as Newton's law of gravity, when it comes to the crime rate, what goes up, generally comes down, and what goes down generally rebounds. While no level of victimization can be termed "acceptable," compared to the early 1990s when a deadly mix of gangs, guns and emerging crack markets fueled an unprecedented surge in violence, the current state is not out of control. Reinvestment in the programs and strategies that worked successfully in the past, along with restored funding levels for policing and prevention, can reverse the current spate of street and gang violence.

The Role of Firearms

The role of firearms in the recent increase in youth killings, shown in Figure 5 (and Table 10) is particularly significant and noteworthy. The percentage of homicides involving a gun has risen to nearly 85% among young black offenders, matching the high-point reached during the early 1990s. The percentage of gun homicides for young white offenders has also grown in recent years, though not quite equaling the level seen during the early 1990s. While the role of guns in homicides committed by older white offenders has continued its steady decline of the past few decades, gun use among black offenders over age 25 has rebounded in recent years.

The especially prominent upturn since 2000 in gun homicide coincides with legislative restrictions upon ATF regarding the dissemination of gun tracing information and other pro-gun legislation that passed through Congress early in this decade. Congress has passed amendments in recent years making it more difficult to identify illegal market sources of crime guns through ATF data.

It is noteworthy that increases since 2000 in gun killings by young offenders have occurred as levels of non-gun homicide remained relatively flat or even decreased. This divergence suggests the need to rethink our nation's approach to reducing availability of firearms to young offenders—those who are more apt to pull the trigger, even over trivial matters, without fully considering the consequences for themselves, much less for others.

Primetime for Juvenile Crime

Regardless of trend, be it upward, downward or stable, the concern for the safety of children is genuine and critical. With parents spending less time supervising their children—some out of choice, others out of necessity for the sake of managing expenses, and a few out of sheer indifference or negligence—an increasing number of youngsters are unsupervised during out-of-school hours. Poor supervision, combined with idleness and boredom, is a recipe for trouble. Far too many youngsters, therefore, are especially at-risk during the afterschool hours for a range of problems, such as violence, as well as drinking, drug use, and teen pregnancy.

Figures 6-7 display the time-of-day patterns of violent victimization for 2006 among juveniles, ages 6 through 17, separately for the months between September and June when school is in session and the two summer months of school vacation. Clearly, the incidence of victimization peaks in the after school hours—the primetime for juvenile crime—when many parents are working and kids are often unsupervised, and then begins to tail off in the evening hours when parents typically are home to monitor their children. Weekend days during the school year reflect a very different pattern in which the evening hours are more problematic. The summer months reveal patterns that are close to that for weekend days of the school year. However, the pronounced peak in the late evening hours of weekend days in the summertime warrants special attention in terms of providing constructive programs and alternative forms of supervision.

Attraction of Gangs

Notwithstanding the tale of official crime statistics, it hardly takes a rocket scientist—or a research criminologist—to recognize that there are increasing numbers of wayward and poorly-supervised youngsters with guns in their hands and gangs in their plans. Regrettably, as the nation celebrated the successful fight against violent crime back in the 1990s, we grew complacent and eased up on our crime-fighting efforts. Unfortunately, the crime problem and the gang

problem do not disappear, and rebounded once we shifted priorities elsewhere. Unless we restore the sense of urgency, some day we may look back and call these the “good old days.”

Even while targeting gangs for intensive enforcement, we need also understand their special appeal. Gangs offer youngsters many desirable advantages—status, excitement, power, praise, profit, protection, mentoring, and opportunity for advancement—healthy goals fulfilled in unhealthy ways. Today’s youngsters who are drawn to gang membership are too young to have witnessed the gang wars of the early 1990s when joining a gang could mean an early grave.

Our challenge, therefore, is to identify and promote healthier means for youngsters to achieve the same need-fulfillment, constructive ways to feel good about themselves and their prospects for the future, while at the same time having fun. This, of course, is where programs like the Boys and Girls Clubs and other youth enrichment initiatives play a significant role, and a role that, given ongoing trends, needs to be expanded.

While many Americans rail on about underage, underprepared, and undermotivated parents “who just need to do a better job of raising and supervising their children,” we recognize that these families cannot do it on their own. We must assist families, not assail them, when they become overwhelmed with the day-to-day struggles of raising children, particularly during an economic downturn. The alternative forms of supervision and mentoring are extraordinarily critical.

Future Possibilities

The fact that the problem of youth violence, especially among minorities, has emerged and persisted for several years suggests that it is hardly an aberration or statistical blip. Moreover, it could worsen in the years ahead as the population of at-risk youth (blacks and Hispanics) grows as a result of both demographic patterns and immigration. Figure 8 shows projected trends in the numbers of young children—infants and toddlers under age 5—over the next decade, using the 2008 counts as a baseline. While the number of white children should change minimally, the pattern is remarkably different among race and ethnic minorities. The number of black children is projected to grow in the years ahead. Growth in the number of Hispanic children, partially tied to immigration patterns, is especially pronounced. Given the social and economic strains that unevenly impact minority communities, growth in the population of at-risk youth signals the clear potential for increased problems of homicide, violence and other social ills associated with an expanding population of underclass youngsters. Whether these demographic trends translate into increasing crime problems ahead largely depends on our willingness to be proactive. The urgency is clear: we must reinvest in children—not just for the purpose of crime prevention, but for

the wide range of benefits associated with promoting their healthy and successful development.

Untimely Budget Cuts

Lulled into complacency by the sharp decline in crime during the 1990s, our nation's priorities appear to have moved away from fighting street crime. A triple whammy at the federal level—related to cops, guns and kids—has hampered proven strategies for crime control.

Federal appropriations in support of law enforcement have been slashed since the early part of the decade, as reflected in Figure 9 in relation to funds for the Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) initiative as well as the Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (JAG) program. In addition, federal support for juvenile justice and prevention programs (Juv Just) has been reduced by half, now a shadow of the former investment.

Drastic funding cuts have led to a significant reduction in police resources among large cities, those with populations of more than 250,000. Specifically, as shown in Figure 10, the number of police officers per 1,000 population for large cities has dropped 8.5% since the year 2000, with most of the decline occurring in the first few years of the decade. By contrast, the level of police protection in cities with populations under 250,000 has remained virtually constant.

Of course, much of the decline can be traced to the changing priorities following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on America. Much of the federal support for law enforcement shifted from hometown security in patrolling high crime neighborhoods to homeland security in protecting the nation's transportation, government and financial centers. Regardless of the level of terrorist threat, however, many more Americans are murdered each year by gunfire than were killed on 9/11. While the focus on combating terrorism is undeniably important, we cannot lose sight of the carnage taking place on our city streets.

In these difficult economic times, the banking and automobile industries have looked to the federal government for assistance. Where is the voice to appeal on behalf of the needs of at-risk youth, as various support programs for children and families are being slashed? We need an at-risk youth bailout.

Principles of Prevention

Unfortunately, not all Americans are convinced about the value of prevention—especially early childhood and youth enrichment efforts. As a result, prevention initiatives are too often funded and implemented on a shoe-string, and a rather short shoe-string with a brief window of opportunity to show results. This is a recipe for failure and provides additional fodder for skeptics.

Smart crime fighting involves a balanced blend of enforcement (from community policing to identifying illegal gun markets), treatment modalities (from drug rehab on demand to community corrections and post-incarceration services) as well as general and targeted crime prevention (from family support to summer jobs for high-risk youth). Regrettably, the prevention approach has at times been disparaged as "worthless" and as "soft of crime." Yet, this cynical perspective reflects gross misunderstanding of the process and goals of prevention, and a selective examination of outcomes. Simply put: Prevention programs *can* work; good prevention programs that are well-implement *do* work.

Besides the matter of funding adequacy, five fundamental principles of crime and violence prevention are critical for effective investment:

1. *No program is successful all the time or for all individuals*. Regardless of the initiative, there will be failures—those who commit crimes or recidivate despite best efforts to prevent it. Rather than focusing on the failures, the goal should be a reasonable reduction in offending rates. In light of the enormous social and administrative costs associated with each criminal act, even modest gains are worthwhile.

2. *Prevention should have an emphasis on the prefix "pre*." While it is unwise and inappropriate to "give up" on even a seemingly hardened offender, the greatest opportunity for positive impact comes with a focus on children—those who are young and impressionable and will be impressed with what a teacher, preacher or some other authority figure has to say. It is well-known that early prevention—during grade school if not earlier—can carry the greatest and lasting impact, before a youngster is seduced by gangs, drugs and crime.

3. *Patience is more than a virtue, it is a requirement*. Prevention is not a short-term strategy. Rather, it involves a continued effort, undaunted by setbacks. Unfortunately, many prevention programs are given short window periods in which to show progress, and are often terminated before the final results are seen.

4. *Prevention should take a multi-faceted approach*. Understandably, there is much temptation to target gang activity as perhaps the most visible and immediate threat to public safety. While the focus on anti-gang initiatives is laudable and should be strengthened, there are many other points of intervention for successful crime reduction programming. For example, several proven and promising strategies are directed at at-risk families with young children. Rather than criticizing struggling underage mothers for their lack of parenting effectiveness, many programs support them in raising children who are less likely to become juvenile offenders. In addition, many school-based initiatives effectively and efficiently enhance the well-being of

large number of children. Behavioral skills training at the elementary school level (such as the modules developed by Boston's Lesson One Foundation), anti-bulling curricula for middle school students (such as the Olweus bullying prevention program) that recognize the link between bullying and later offending, peer-mediation and mentoring program in high school, after-school activities targeted at the "prime time for juvenile crime" (such as the Boys and Girls Clubs) all have payoffs far greater than the investment.

5. *Prevention is significantly cost-effective*. Virtually all assessments of crime prevention confirm the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of prison time. It is, however, a political reality that sound investments in crime prevention can take years to reap the benefits. For example, the Perry pre-school program experiment implemented in Ypsilanti, Michigan translated into a 17-to-1 rate of return on investment, yet it wasn't until years later when the preschoolers matured that their significantly lower involvement in crime, alcohol and drug abuse was observed. It takes a bold leader to earmark funds today for tomorrow's success that his/her successor will derive.

Conclusion

The current surge in youth violence was anticipated years ago. Even while rates of crime were falling in the 1990s, criminologists warned about the potential for another wave of youth and gang violence ahead, a not-so-perfect storm combining an upward trend in the at-risk youth population with a downward trend in spending on social and educational programs to support youth.

Furthermore, we should not be surprised if the concomitant increase in the number of at-risk youth, especially black and Hispanic children with less than adequate supervision, combined with recent budget cuts for youth programs and crime control initiatives, translates into further increases in gang and gun violence. We're already seeing the early signs.

The good news--or at least the encouraging word--is that the crime problem is not out of control, at least by contrast to the early 1990s when the nation's murder rate was almost twice what it is today. It is not surprising that a small bounce back would occur after the glory years of the late 1990s. But let this small upturn serve as a thunderous wake-up call that crime prevention needs to be a priority once again.

At this juncture, we must, of course, look toward immediate solutions for controlling gang activity and easy access to illegal firearms—approaches that depend heavily on police personnel, intelligence, and deployment. At the same time, however, we must maintain a long-range view toward the future as the population of young children—especially race and ethnic minorities—grows. The choice is ours: pay for the programs now or pray for the victims later.

Data Sources and Technical Notes

Several data sources were used in completion of this report. Most prominently, the data on homicide victimization and offending come from a multiply-imputed cumulative file of the Supplementary Homicide Reports for the years 1976-2007, created by the authors. Compiled as part of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) include incident-level data on the month and year of the offense; on the reporting agency and its residential population, county, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) codes, geographic division, and population group; on the age, sex, and race of all victims and offenders; and on the victim–offender relationship, weapon use, and circumstances of the crime. The SHR records are incomplete on a small percentage (2.5%) of victims, yet a substantial percentage (32.5%) of perpetrators largely as a result of unsolved offenses. However, a process of multiple-imputation was employed to fill in the gaps (based on available information about the incomplete reports) so that characteristics of victims and offenders can be reliably and accurately estimated. In addition, approximately eight percent of homicides are not covered in the SHR data files. To adjust for under-reporting, adjustment weights were applied based on comparisons to mortality data from coroners' reports and to the aggregated homicide counts reported by the FBI in the *Crime in the United States* series. Aided by this imputation and weighting process, all counts and rates, particularly for offender data, are estimates, although reliable ones.

Calculations of the time-of-day distribution for violent crime victimization for school-age youngsters (ages 6 through 17) were based on National Incident-Based Reporting Data (NIBRS) for 2006 archived at the University of Michigan. Although NIBRS coverage is not nationally representative, there is little reason to believe that the time patterns are adversely affected by gaps in NIBRS coverage. In fact, state-by-state analyses of these time patterns reveals general consistency across various parts of the country, providing support for the assumed representativeness of the sample data with regard to time-of-day distributions.

Homicide rate calculations and demographic projections relied on U.S. Census Bureau annual estimates of resident population by age, sex and race. Available race-bridged estimates were used to enable a smooth transition between the multiple-race classifications of the 2000 Census counts and the singular-race designations of earlier Census counts.

Finally, data on police personnel were drawn from figures published annually by the FBI in *Crime in the United States*. Information on federal appropriations for justice-related programs was drawn from figures compiled and reported by the National Criminal Justice Association, a Washington, D.C.-based justice policy organization.



Figure 1: Percentage Change since 2000 in Homicide Victimization by Selected Groups



Figure 2: Percentage Change since 2000 in Homicide Offending by Selected Groups



Figure 3: Homicide Offending Rates by Age, White Males



Figure 4: Homicide Offending Rates by Age, Black Males



Figure 5: Percent Gun Homicide by Offender Race and Age



Figure 6: Time of Day Youth Violent Victimization, School Months, 2006



Figure 7: Time of Day Youth Violent Victimization, Summer Months, 2006



Figure 8: Projected Growth in Population under Age Five



Figure 9: Federal Appropriations in Support of Law Enforcement and Juvenile Justice



Figure 10: Trends in Police Protection by City Size

Table 1: Homicides by Victim and Offender Characteristics

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pct change 00/01-06/07
All victims	15,586	16,037	16,204	16,528	16,148	16,740	17,034	16,929	7.4%
Victim age									
Under 14	898	962	916	887	886	885	895	930	-1.9%
14-17	798	779	770	750	794	851	964	969	22.6%
18-24	3,919	4,157	4,220	4,426	4,049	4,313	4,433	4,333	8.5%
25-34	3,954	4,091	4,160	4,242	4,154	4,346	4,316	4,344	7.7%
35-49	4,002	3,949	4,021	4,034	3,965	4,029	4,048	4,015	1.4%
50-64	1,239	1,291	1,325	1,362	1,465	1,502	1,667	1,605	29.3%
65+	777	808	792	827	835	815	712	733	-8.9%
Victim sex									
Male	11,800	12,226	12,399	12,798	12,560	13,140	13,399	13,256	10.9%
Female	3,786	3,811	3,805	3,730	3,588	3,600	3,635	3,673	-3.8%
Victim Race									
White	7,828	8,189	8,089	8,218	8,253	8,391	8,255	8,286	3.3%
Black	7,239	7,294	7,539	7,698	7,341	7,763	8,167	8,117	12.1%
Other	519	554	577	612	554	586	611	526	6.1%
All offenders	17,812	18,228	18,295	18,505	18,258	19,326	19,938	19,568	9.6%
Offender age									
Under 18	1,574	1,598	1,543	1,568	1,585	1,675	1,896	1,858	18.3%
18-24	7,012	7,354	7,221	7,352	7,045	7,561	7,859	7,534	7.2%
25-34	4,610	4,688	4,874	4,868	4,802	5,161	5,253	5,187	12.3%
35-49	3,366	3,401	3,409	3,469	3,465	3,552	3,544	3,518	4.4%
50+	1,249	1,187	1,247	1,248	1,361	1,377	1,386	1,470	17.3%
Offender Sex									
Male	16,085	16,478	16,555	16,747	16,489	17,467	18,136	17,729	10.1%
Female	1,727	1,749	1,739	1,758	1,769	1,859	1,802	1,839	4.7%
Offender Race									
White	7,829	8,189	8,234	8,098	8,318	8,379	8,296	8,290	3.5%
Black	9,486	9,553	9,562	9,836	9,442	10,412	11,115	10,814	15.2%
Other	496	486	498	570	498	535	526	464	0.9%

Table 2: Homicide Victimization by Sex, Age, Race and Weapon

				2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pct change 00/01-06/07
Male	14-17	White	Total	293	269	262	265	288	323	333	323	16.7%
			Gun	232	186	211	193	230	255	274	243	23.7%
			Non-gun	61	83	51	72	58	68	59	79	-4.2%
		Black	Total	333	333	300	332	349	376	459	468	39.2%
			Gun	303	279	266	293	305	336	406	426	43.0%
			Non-gun	30	53	34	39	44	41	54	41	14.5%
	18-24	White	Total	1,276	1,406	1,417	1,481	1,370	1,434	1,382	1,406	3.9%
			Gun	945	1,026	1,101	1,159	1,002	1,070	1,051	1,064	7.3%
			Non-gun	331	380	316	321	368	364	330	342	-5.5%
		Black	Total	1,977	2,083	2,107	2,195	2,019	2,190	2,334	2,267	13.3%
			Gun	1,782	1,791	1,898	1,977	1,839	1,991	2,102	2,069	16.7%
			Non-gun	195	293	210	218	180	199	231	198	-11.8%
	25+	White	Total	3,683	3,829	3,862	3,927	4,051	4,082	4,012	3,982	6.4%
			Gun	2,229	2,288	2,365	2,382	2,484	2,558	2,408	2,426	7.0%
			Non-gun	1,455	1,541	1,497	1,545	1,566	1,525	1,604	1,556	5.5%
		Black	Total	3,384	3,395	3,578	3,693	3,595	3,798	3,900	3,963	16.0%
			Gun	2,548	2,473	2,743	2,890	2,788	2,965	3,012	3,113	22.0%
			Non-gun	836	923	835	803	807	833	887	850	-1.2%
Female	14-17	White	Total	87	86	93	67	76	73	86	82	-2.9%
			Gun	42	46	56	34	39	37	42	43	-3.4%
			Non-gun	45	40	37	34	37	36	44	39	-2.4%
		Black	Total	57	50	83	51	54	55	57	68	16.8%
			Gun	31	25	53	28	31	43	36	49	51.8%
			Non-gun	26	26	30	23	23	12	21	20	-21.2%
	18-24	White	Total	297	346	322	350	316	279	312	311	-3.0%
			Gun	160	166	161	185	156	133	153	181	2.2%
			Non-gun	137	180	161	164	160	146	160	130	-8.4%
		Black	Total	269	208	250	258	212	249	247	241	2.3%
			Gun	155	129	177	166	133	155	186	167	24.0%
			Non-gun	114	78	73	92	79	93	61	74	-29.7%
	25+	White	Total	1,671	1,683	1,621	1,616	1,616	1,692	1,607	1,629	-3.5%
			Gun	809	745	782	741	735	837	765	768	-1.4%
			Non-gun	862	937	839	875	881	855	842	861	-5.4%
		Black	Total	872	869	865	827	792	754	840	774	-7.3%
			Gun	432	410	409	393	357	391	442	385	-1.7%
			Non-gun	440	459	457	435	434	364	397	389	-12.5%

Table 3: Homicide Offending by Sex, Age, Race and Weapon

				2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pct change 00/01-06/07
Male	14-17	White	Total	539	558	575	545	556	546	579	547	2.6%
			Gun	368	335	366	362	344	367	380	384	8.7%
			Non-gun	171	223	210	183	213	179	199	162	-8.3%
		Black	Total	851	840	798	843	876	960	1,130	1,142	34.3%
			Gun	698	665	657	717	708	792	944	964	40.0%
			Non-gun	153	175	141	126	168	168	186	177	10.8%
	18-24	White	Total	2,397	2,644	2,578	2,535	2,495	2,559	2,536	2,408	-1.9%
			Gun	1,461	1,595	1,673	1,579	1,515	1,660	1,602	1,535	2.7%
			Non-gun	936	1,048	906	955	980	899	934	873	-8.9%
		Black	Total	3,971	4,022	3,935	4,085	3,871	4,243	4,570	4,416	12.4%
			Gun	3,306	3,262	3,293	3,460	3,316	3,650	3,941	3,808	18.0%
			Non-gun	665	760	642	625	555	593	629	608	-13.2%
	25+	White	Total	3,998	4,106	4,147	4,084	4,296	4,308	4,256	4,307	5.7%
			Gun	2,143	2,130	2,318	2,235	2,301	2,402	2,299	2,327	8.3%
			Non-gun	1,855	1,977	1,830	1,849	1,995	1,906	1,957	1,980	2.8%
		Black	Total	3,892	3,879	4,080	4,136	3,955	4,392	4,591	4,494	16.9%
			Gun	2,623	2,523	2,829	2,890	2,749	3,187	3,270	3,248	26.7%
			Non-gun	1,269	1,356	1,251	1,246	1,206	1,205	1,320	1,246	-2.3%
Female	14-17	White	Total	65	73	65	79	63	47	61	67	-7.5%
			Gun	21	22	27	28	24	15	25	26	19.8%
			Non-gun	43	52	38	51	38	33	36	40	-19.8%
		Black	Total	61	69	59	56	46	67	62	64	-2.5%
			Gun	25	27	26	18	23	33	38	36	40.1%
			Non-gun	36	41	34	38	23	34	25	28	-31.7%
	18-24	White	Total	206	242	271	260	260	250	263	278	20.7%
			Gun	82	65	110	80	103	101	112	114	54.5%
			Non-gun	125	177	162	180	157	149	151	164	4.3%
		Black	Total	251	272	250	259	228	289	286	249	2.3%
			Gun	114	134	125	123	110	146	158	140	20.9%
			Non-gun	137	139	125	136	118	143	128	108	-14.4%
	25+	White	Total	624	566	597	596	647	670	601	683	7.9%
			Gun	260	224	254	230	268	258	257	269	8.6%
			Non-gun	364	341	343	365	379	412	344	413	7.4%
		Black	Total	461	470	439	455	467	461	476	450	-0.6%
			Gun	164	172	146	163	186	190	190	195	14.7%
			Non-gun	297	298	294	292	280	271	286	254	-9.3%

Table 4: Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 by Geographic Division and Race

		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pct change 00/01-06/07
New England	White	74	92	71	66	79	85	92	87	7.5%
	Black	80	84	83	65	101	102	99	100	22.3%
Middle Atlantic	White	289	124	318	305	292	255	284	251	29.4%
	Black	777	296	682	761	708	782	830	757	47.8%
East North Central	White	303	424	339	340	315	323	324	309	-13.0%
	Black	1,001	1,160	1,091	1,050	938	1,142	1,226	1,135	9.3%
West North Central	White	138	107	125	108	122	111	105	148	3.8%
	Black	249	187	205	196	240	246	245	236	10.3%
South Atlantic	White	268	264	346	343	269	314	292	285	8.5%
	Black	1,028	906	1,079	1,146	974	1,110	1,178	1,251	25.6%
East South Central	White	130	131	129	125	127	127	121	117	-9.0%
	Black	407	447	417	404	339	417	466	463	8.6%
West South Central	White	501	511	492	514	470	483	450	426	-13.5%
	Black	597	588	546	641	641	635	735	694	20.6%
Mountain	White	266	331	310	352	378	357	365	384	25.5%
	Black	63	98	90	101	101	126	111	117	41.4%
Pacific	White	826	885	923	832	888	927	938	834	3.6%
	Black	400	441	469	442	493	511	504	425	10.5%

Table 5: Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 by Population Group and Race

		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pct change 00/01-06/07
1,000,000 +	White	809	915	866	813	763	733	728	632	-21.1%
	Black	1,179	1,161	1,124	1,132	1,019	1,043	1,180	976	-7.9%
500,000 - 999,999	White	200	265	251	273	243	263	249	301	18.4%
	Black	933	933	868	885	844	1,073	1,140	1,118	21.0%
250,000 - 499,999	White	255	209	265	244	261	239	251	261	10.3%
	Black	673	696	698	731	728	716	778	663	5.2%
100,000 - 249,999	White	375	402	331	398	391	422	447	442	14.4%
	Black	712	823	756	776	767	982	921	1,037	27.5%
50,000 - 99,999	White	295	335	296	316	337	334	287	304	-6.2%
	Black	416	380	384	365	387	434	553	505	33.0%
25,000 - 49,999	White	205	180	188	192	226	210	214	222	13.3%
	Black	253	199	203	240	243	245	290	289	28.2%
10,000 - 24,999	White	150	174	152	170	163	176	191	158	7.7%
	Black	170	236	167	190	186	180	212	279	21.0%

Table 6: Change in Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 among States

	White			Black		
	2000-01	2006-07	% Chg	2000-01	2006-07	% Chg
Alabama	70	50	-29%	215	282	31%
Alaska	13	11		3	8	
Arizona	257	300	17%	46	86	87%
Arkansas	54	42	-22%	126	109	-13%
California	1521	1618	6%	764	871	14%
Colorado	108	121	12%	46	40	-12%
Connecticut	51	43	-15%	66	63	-4%
Delaware	11	21	83%	23	50	121%
Georgia	132	118	-11%	447	530	19%
Hawaii	4	12		0	1	
Idaho	14	50	264%	0	0	
Illinois	314	211	-33%	818	711	-13%
Indiana	92	90	-2%	284	222	-22%
Iowa	28	34	21%	9	14	
Kansas	112	70	-38%	40	88	120%
Kentucky	40	49	23%	113	76	-32%
Louisiana	67	60	-9%	461	524	14%
Maine	8	12		0	0	
Maryland	68	84	23%	445	533	20%
Massachusetts	70	82	17%	65	129	98%
Michigan	140	137	-2%	588	728	24%
Minnesota	40	31	-22%	70	93	32%
Mississippi	46	28	-40%	254	183	-28%
Missouri	70	80	14%	273	251	-8%
Montana	20	17	-16%	0	2	
Nebraska	38	33	-14%	5	18	
Nevada	80	100	25%	55	88	60%
New Hampshire	11	17	57%	0	1	
New Jersey	86	112	30%	238	358	50%
New Mexico	81	114	41%	11	7	-33%
New York	231	291	26%	473	659	39%
North Carolina	141	139	-1%	407	452	11%
North Dakota	2	6		0	3	
Ohio	129	146	13%	317	456	44%
Oklahoma	73	84	15%	76	121	60%
Oregon	42	44	3%	15	9	-43%
Pennsylvania	148	136	-8%	526	570	8%
Rhode Island	21	14	-30%	30	7	-77%
South Carolina	65	92	43%	266	433	63%
South Dakota	5	8		1	0	
Tennessee	98	103	6%	276	382	38%
Texas	811	676	-17%	535	689	29%
Utah	36	41	14%	4	1	
Vermont	6	10		0	1	
Virginia	90	99	9%	326	405	24%
Washington	131	90	-31%	59	43	-27%
West Virginia	21	26	25%	5	20	
Wisconsin	70	57	-19%	156	230	47%
Wyoming	5	10		0	0	

Note: Percentage change calculations omitted where base counts are below 10.

Table 7: Change in Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 among Cities

	White			Black		
	2000-01	2006-07	% Chg	2000-01	2006-07	% Chg
Austin	36	24	-33%	16	14	-13%
Baltimore	36	24	-33%	464	490	6%
Boston	15	9	-40%	36	64	78%
Charlotte	30	21	-30%	122	102	-16%
Chicago	294	157	-47%	656	460	-30%
Columbus	24	26	8%	54	93	72%
Dallas	121	65	-46%	194	116	-40%
Denver	24	34	42%	17	17	0%
Detroit	39	43	10%	496	602	21%
El Paso	13	14	8%	1	2	
Fort Worth	41	31	-24%	28	41	46%
Houston	192	173	-10%	131	313	139%
Indianapolis	15	31	107%	104	103	-1%
Las Vegas	60	78	30%	38	76	100%
Los Angeles	475	379	-20%	300	233	-22%
Memphis	12	10	-17%	187	186	-1%
Milwaukee	45	47	4%	158	256	62%
Nashville	25	26	4%	95	112	18%
New York	284	191	-33%	555	436	-21%
Oklahoma City	21	25	19%	26	48	85%
Philadelphia	50	49	-2%	391	404	3%
Phoenix	149	163	9%	30	56	87%
Portland	12	9	-25%	13	7	-46%
San Antonio	73	71	-3%	26	36	38%
San Diego	26	34	31%	18	26	44%
San Francisco	25	33	32%	28	50	79%
San Jose	21	44	110%	3	4	
Seattle	14	8	-43%	15	6	-60%

Note: Percentage change calculations omitted where base counts are below 10

Table 8: Trends in Homicide Victimization Rates among Males by Age and Race

	14-17		18-24		25+	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1976	2.9	15.9	8.3	59.7	6.7	57.4
1977	3.2	15.7	9.1	57.4	6.8	54.3
1978	3.6	15.0	9.5	56.7	7.0	52.5
1979	3.7	16.2	11.4	59.6	7.5	56.2
1980	4.0	18.2	11.6	63.8	7.8	56.6
1981	3.4	15.2	10.7	56.3	7.7	53.0
1982	3.0	15.0	10.2	51.1	7.2	45.7
1983	2.9	13.7	9.0	48.4	6.5	41.0
1984	2.8	13.1	9.0	45.0	6.2	38.3
1985	3.0	16.6	8.6	47.2	6.3	37.7
1986	3.5	17.6	9.4	53.6	6.4	41.2
1987	3.2	22.9	8.7	57.8	6.1	38.8
1988	3.3	26.5	8.5	66.0	5.8	42.5
1989	3.9	33.0	9.0	74.5	5.7	42.5
1990	5.2	37.0	10.4	87.6	6.0	44.9
1991	5.7	42.8	11.5	99.6	6.0	43.9
1992	6.2	41.8	11.2	95.0	5.8	40.0
1993	6.4	47.0	11.0	102.9	5.8	40.5
1994	5.8	43.0	11.1	97.8	5.4	38.3
1995	6.0	39.9	10.9	82.7	5.0	33.7
1996	5.2	31.1	9.2	75.7	4.7	29.6
1997	4.0	25.0	9.0	75.6	4.2	27.0
1998	4.0	19.9	8.8	66.1	4.0	24.8
1999	3.5	19.0	7.7	57.6	3.7	21.6
2000	2.9	15.2	7.2	55.9	3.6	21.8
2001	2.7	14.7	7.8	54.9	3.6	21.4
2002	2.7	14.5	7.6	55.0	3.6	22.0
2003	2.5	14.3	7.9	56.1	3.6	22.1
2004	2.8	14.8	7.2	49.8	3.6	21.1
2005	3.0	15.6	7.3	53.6	3.7	21.5
2006	3.1	18.4	7.2	55.8	3.5	22.0
2007	3.0	19.0	7.3	53.6	3.5	21.7

Table 9: Trends in Homicide Offending Rates among Males by Age and Race

	14-17		18-24		25+	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1976	10.9	73.0	21.8	166.4	9.8	99.6
1977	11.1	64.1	22.7	153.1	10.2	94.5
1978	11.1	65.7	23.9	158.8	10.5	93.8
1979	13.2	70.1	27.1	176.2	11.2	99.9
1980	14.5	83.2	31.0	198.1	12.2	104.8
1981	12.0	73.1	27.3	168.6	11.6	95.8
1982	11.8	64.1	25.0	155.4	11.0	83.6
1983	10.7	54.4	23.6	138.4	9.8	76.2
1984	10.1	53.9	24.2	125.6	9.7	71.8
1985	10.4	66.8	22.9	135.1	9.5	70.0
1986	13.8	82.7	24.7	156.0	9.8	75.0
1987	12.8	92.1	23.9	166.9	9.3	69.9
1988	14.4	116.8	23.7	203.4	8.8	75.6
1989	15.9	134.0	26.1	230.2	8.6	73.0
1990	20.9	178.4	29.8	270.3	9.1	77.8
1991	21.5	200.2	32.3	323.4	9.2	77.6
1992	21.9	189.1	31.2	298.2	8.4	71.1
1993	22.2	225.3	31.8	328.8	8.2	70.9
1994	22.8	212.0	30.8	312.5	7.8	66.0
1995	20.9	163.1	31.1	273.8	7.5	58.5
1996	16.2	124.3	30.2	266.7	6.8	53.7
1997	14.3	110.5	27.1	247.4	6.0	50.2
1998	12.3	81.8	27.1	218.7	6.2	45.6
1999	9.7	73.3	22.9	201.8	5.5	40.5
2000	8.2	66.2	21.7	198.3	5.4	41.2
2001	8.4	64.2	23.2	193.2	5.5	40.3
2002	8.6	60.2	22.2	183.7	5.5	41.7
2003	8.2	62.9	21.6	186.7	5.4	41.8
2004	8.3	64.2	21.0	172.7	5.6	39.2
2005	8.1	69.1	21.4	186.1	5.5	42.7
2006	8.6	80.3	21.1	197.0	5.4	43.8
2007	8.1	80.6	20.1	188.4	5.4	42.2

Table 10: Percent Gun Homicide by Offender Race and Age

	White		Black	
	14-24	25+	14-24	25+
1976	51.2%	65.1%	62.2%	69.8%
1977	52.7%	64.8%	62.4%	67.8%
1978	54.0%	65.8%	63.4%	69.7%
1979	52.8%	66.4%	64.0%	68.8%
1980	52.5%	63.7%	64.2%	68.5%
1981	50.5%	64.5%	64.4%	67.7%
1982	48.6%	64.2%	60.3%	64.7%
1983	47.3%	62.4%	58.2%	62.1%
1984	49.3%	61.5%	59.9%	63.4%
1985	49.7%	61.8%	61.0%	62.6%
1986	51.4%	58.1%	65.6%	60.2%
1987	51.1%	58.4%	67.5%	58.3%
1988	53.6%	59.3%	72.0%	59.5%
1989	58.2%	59.2%	75.2%	59.4%
1990	60.9%	58.6%	77.8%	61.1%
1991	62.8%	59.3%	80.5%	62.1%
1992	65.2%	59.8%	83.0%	63.8%
1993	67.2%	60.2%	83.3%	65.3%
1994	68.1%	59.4%	84.6%	66.4%
1995	67.2%	58.9%	82.7%	63.7%
1996	64.3%	56.6%	82.7%	62.9%
1997	64.7%	55.6%	83.3%	63.9%
1998	61.0%	53.6%	79.2%	61.3%
1999	59.9%	52.0%	82.1%	64.7%
2000	60.2%	52.0%	80.7%	64.0%
2001	57.4%	50.4%	78.6%	62.0%
2002	62.3%	54.2%	81.3%	65.8%
2003	60.0%	52.7%	82.3%	66.5%
2004	58.8%	52.0%	82.8%	66.4%
2005	63.0%	53.4%	83.1%	69.6%
2006	61.6%	52.6%	84.0%	68.3%
2007	62.4%	52.0%	84.3%	69.7%